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Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two
remote parties to grow a shared secret key. Its
security is founded on the principles of quantum
mechanics, but in reality it significantly relies on
the physical implementation. Technological im-
perfections of QKD systems have been previously
explored, but no attack on an established QKD
connection has been realized so far. Here we
show the first full-field implementation of a com-
plete attack on a running QKD connection. An
installed eavesdropper obtains the entire ‘secret’
key, while none of the parameters monitored by
the legitimate parties indicate a security breach.
This confirms that non-idealities in physical im-
plementations of QKD can be fully practically ex-
ploitable, and must be given increased scrutiny if
quantum cryptography is to become highly se-
cure.
Secret communication provided by cryptography is
needed in many activities of the human civilization –
military, commerce, government and private affairs. The
long history of cryptography is a continual cat-and-mouse
game of cryptographic systems being broken and replaced
with new, stronger ones1. Quantum cryptography, as one
of the latest techniques, promised for the first time a se-
curity which is not based on mathematical conjectures
but on the laws of physics2,3. Technologically, quantum
cryptography has matured to experiments over ≤250 km
distance4, and several commercial systems are available.
Although security of the QKD protocol is unconditionally
proven5,6, deviations of actual hardware from the ideal-
ized model still present a challenge. Various attacks have
been proposed exploiting imperfections of components
in QKD scheme: light modulators7,8, photon sources9,10
and detectors11–17. However none of these proposals im-
plemented an attack that eavesdropped the secret key,
leaving the question of practicality of technological vul-
nerabilities unresolved.
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We picked one of the proposed attack methods, fully
implemented the eavesdropper Eve, and used it to attack
an installed QKD line. The QKD system under attack
is a well-designed one used previously in several experi-
ments18–20, and openly documented21. We treated QKD
hardware and software as ‘given’ and kept all its settings
as they had been set for QKD prior to this study. The
hardware and software are assumed fully known to Eve,
according to Kerckhoffs’ principle22.
In this paper, we demonstrate the full-field implemen-
tation of this eavesdropping attack in realistic conditions
over a 290-m fibre link between the transmitter Alice and
the receiver Bob. From multiple QKD sessions over a few
hours, Eve obtains the same ‘secret’ key as Bob, while
the usual parameters monitored in the QKD exchange
are not disturbed, leaving Eve undetected.
RESULTS
A. The faked-state attack
We have chosen a ‘faked-state attack’ (Fig. 1a)23. Eve
uses a replica of the legitimate receiver unit (Bob′) to
intercept and measure all quantum states sent by Alice.
She further uses a faked-state generator (FSG) to force
Bob to output identical bases and bit values, so that Eve
and Bob have the same raw key. Eve also records un-
encrypted communication in the classical channel, and
computes the final secret key (identical to Alice’s and
Bob’s) by repeating the same sifting, error correction and
privacy amplification procedures3,6 as Bob. Unlike the
traditional intercept-resend attack2,3, the faked-state at-
tack does not introduce errors in the key and therefore is
not detected by the QKD protocol.
Eve’s full control of Bob’s detection outcomes is crucial
to the success of the faked-state attack. Several tech-
nological vulnerabilities allow for the needed degree of
control12,15,17,23. We have chosen to exploit blindabil-
ity and controllability of single-photon detectors under
strong illumination15,16. The QKD system under attack
uses passively quenched single-photon avalanche photo-
diodes (APDs, Fig. 2a). Ordinarily, the arrival of a single
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FIG. 1. Eavesdropping experiment. (a) Principle of the faked-state attack. (b) Attack on installed QKD system spanning
four buildings at the campus of the National University of Singapore. In Alice, polarization-entangled photon pairs were
produced in a type-II spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) source18,20. One photon was measured locally by
Alice; the other one was sent through a 290 m single-mode (SM) fibre line to Bob. Eve was inserted at a mid-way point. All
three parties used identical polarization analysers (PA); clicks were registered with timestamp units (TS). Under attack, Bob’s
detectors clicked controllably when illuminated by an optical pulse with peak power ≥ Pth. In the example, to address the
target detector for vertically polarized photons, Eve sent a faked state with vertical polarization and peak power 2Pth. Each
of Bob’s detectors in the conjugate (45 ◦ rotated) basis received a pulse of peak power Pth/2, and thus remained blinded. See
Methods Section A for a complete description of Eve’s setup. In the diagram: BS, 50/50% beamsplitter; PBS, polarizing
beamsplitter; HWP, half-wave plate; FPC, fibre polarization controller; BBO, β-barium-borate crystal.
photon generates an electron-hole pair that leads to an
avalanche in the APD. The resulting current spike is de-
tected by a comparator and a pulse-shaper as the arrival
of a single photon, a ‘click’. Spurious capacitances of
the device result in a finite recharging time and cause
a detector deadtime of ∼ 1µs. If the illumination level
is increased such that no full recharge occurs between
individual photons, the avalanche becomes progressively
smaller. Under higher illumination conditions, it falls
below the comparator threshold and can not be iden-
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FIG. 2. Detector blinding and control. (a) Circuit dia-
gram of the custom-built single-photon detectors used in the
QKD system under attack18–20. An avalanche photodiode
(APD, PerkinElmer C30902S) is biased 15 V above its break-
down voltage from a voltage supply +Vbias ≈ 220 V. The
avalanche current is fed by a charge stored in a small stray
capacitance (≈ 1.2 pF) and is detected via a voltage spike at
the 100 Ω resistor. The avalanche quickly self-quenches due
to discharge of the capacitance and concomitant bias voltage
drop; its recharge and recovery of single-photon sensitivity
takes ∼ 1µs. (b) Oscillograms show one of the detectors
blinded after switching on 38 pW continuous-wave (c.w.) il-
lumination. (c) Oscillograms show the same detector blinded
with 17µW c.w. illumination. A superimposed optical trig-
ger pulse with a peak power of 2.3 mW never causes a click,
whereas one with Pth = 2.6 mW always does.
tified as a click; the detector becomes blind (Fig. 2b).
Hence, by injecting high light levels into the channel, it
is straightforward for Eve to indefinitely blind Bob’s de-
tectors. Under these illumination conditions, the APD no
longer behaves as a single-photon detector, but as a clas-
sical photodiode generating photocurrent proportional to
the optical power. A strong light pulse with peak power
above a threshold Pth generates a current spike that mim-
ics the signal of a legitimate photon (Fig. 2c)16.
B. Experimental implementation
This QKD implementation has four detectors and uti-
lizes a four-state protocol with polarization coding and
passive basis choice (Fig. 1b). Eve can blind all detec-
tors using a laser diode (LD) emitting continuous-wave
TABLE I. Fidelity of Eve’s control over Bob.
Faked states Clicks at Bob
sent by Eve V −45 ◦ H +45 ◦
1,702,067 V
1,693,799
99.51%
0 0 0
2,055,059 −45 ◦ 0
2,048,072
99.66%
0 0
2,620,099 H 0 0
2,614,918
99.80%
0
2,359,494 +45 ◦ 0 0 0
2,358,418
99.95%
The 4× 4 matrix shows the total number of clicks in each of Bob’s
detectors as well as their percentage in respect to the faked states
sent with the same polarization. The data was recorded during a
5min diagnostic-mode session. The lack of off-diagonal elements
proves that a click is never launched in a wrong detector. Double
clicks are not included. The overall click rate is close to 100%,
leading to virtually no loss in the line Eve–Bob.
(c.w.) circularly polarized light, which splits evenly be-
tween Bob’s detectors. To selectively make one detector
click while keeping the other three blinded, Eve adds a
linearly polarized pulse of the same polarization as the
target detector, and peak power 2Pth. By using four
LDs aligned to vertical, horizontal and ±45 ◦ polariza-
tions, Eve has the option to deliberately launch a click in
any of Bob’s detectors. She then executes the faked-state
attack.
Before attack, we inserted Eve into the line and manu-
ally aligned her polarizations to match Bob’s detector set-
tings. Then we characterized fidelity of her control over
Bob. During a 5 min session Eve received 8,736,719 clicks
and resent an equal number of faked states to Bob. Of
the latter, 99.75% caused clicks in Bob, and more impor-
tantly those clicks were always produced in the intended
detector (Table I). Since the synchronization protocol in-
volves Bob sending to Alice precise timing of every click
registered21, Eve can easily identify and discard the few
faked states that did not register at Bob, and that will
be discarded in the reconciliation between Alice and Bob.
After this, she has an identical record with Bob. Owing
to small imperfections in tuning Eve’s FSG (Methods
Section A), Bob had a probability of 5× 10−7 to register
simultaneous clicks in two detectors, corresponding to 4
events in 323 seconds. In this QKD implementation, such
double clicks were treated as noise and discarded (which
is obviously insecure but easily patchable by assigning in-
stead random bit values24). We remark that our control
scheme could be extended to reproduce arbitrary clicks
in several detectors with a more complex FSG, which is
however not needed in the present experiment.
C. QKD performance and key extraction
After Eve’s calibration, we ran multiple 5–10 min QKD
sessions over a few hours, some with Eve inserted in
the fibre line and some without. We recorded perfor-
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FIG. 3. QKD performance with and without eaves-
dropping as measured by Alice and Bob. Session with-
out Eve in the fibre line (left). Eve installed (right). The
traces in the top chart correspond to the raw key rate, sifted
key rate and final secret key rate after error correction and
privacy amplification18,20. The bottom chart shows the quan-
tum bit error ratio (QBER).
mance statistics, all public communication data between
Alice and Bob, and the generated keys. During QKD,
the legitimate parties monitor key rates to check the line
transmission. Fig. 3 shows results from two typical ses-
sions, one eavesdropped and one not. As expected, in-
serting Eve does not alter the rates. Small differences
in rate averages of the two sessions are not caused by
eavesdropping but rather are normal medium-term align-
ment fluctuations in this QKD system. The quantum
bit error ratio (QBER) of 5–6% is typical for this ex-
periment18–20, and well below the security limit for the
Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) protocol used
here6.
In the sessions where Eve was connected, she extracted
Bob’s sifted key from her clicks and the recorded pub-
lic communication Alice–Bob. Alice and Bob identify
photon pairs by time-tagging each detector click and ex-
changing these times over the public channel21. This al-
lows them to synchronize their clocks and to keep track
of what photons were detected. Bob also announces his
detection bases, and Alice answers for which Bob’s clicks
she detected the other photon of the pair in the same
basis (these pairs form the sifted key). Since no mea-
surement outcomes are revealed, this information can be
entirely public. In the present implementation, this chan-
nel is established over a transmission control protocol and
internet protocol (TCP/IP) wireless connection, and is
passively wiretapped by Eve. She watches the discus-
sion, synchronizes her clock with Bob’s clock, then sifts
her key keeping only those of her clicks which are also
kept by Alice and Bob in the sifted key. We ran Eve’s
processing script on recorded experimental data and ver-
ified that in all eavesdropped QKD sessions, Eve’s sifted
key was identical to Bob’s (the script and data sample
are available, Methods Section C).
If the source, analysers and transmission medium were
perfect, this sifted key would directly constitute the se-
cret key. Under realistic conditions, the sifted keys of Al-
ice and Bob are not identical (the difference being quan-
tified by the quantum bit error ratio). Further steps of
error correction and privacy amplification complete the
public exchange Alice–Bob to produce the secret key3,6.
Since Eve has the same sifted key as Bob, she can apply
the same processing as Bob to it, and is guaranteed to
produce the same secret key.
DISCUSSION
The particular weakness exploited in this work can be
closed by developing suitable countermeasures25. The
incoming blinding light may be detected, either by a sep-
arate watchdog detector or by monitoring electrical and
thermal parameters of the APDs. Single-photon sensi-
tivity of Bob’s APDs can be tested at random times by a
calibrated light source placed inside Bob. The eavesdrop-
per introduces 212 ns time delay (Methods Section B),
however monitoring may be impractical, and Eve can
compensate this delay by shortening the fibre line. Eve’s
need to calibrate her FSG before the attack cannot be
considered a reliable deterrent, because she may calibrate
non-obtrusively23. Other countermeasure proposals that
break the described attack exist and may be relatively
easy to implement. However a countermeasure that in-
corporates into the existing security proofs5,6,26,27, such
as the one in ref. 25, has not yet been implemented.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a complete and
undetected eavesdropping attack against an established
QKD system. The success of this demonstration proves
that a technological imperfection in a QKD system can be
fully exploited using off-the-shelf components. As there
is a variety of potentially exploitable loopholes in both re-
search and commercial QKD systems7,8,10–17,23, Eve can
design a tailored attack on one or the other implemen-
tation problem. We have briefly discussed how one par-
ticular loophole can be closed. However, a more pointed
question is what problems still lurk unnoticed in the gap
between the theoretical description and the practical sys-
tems28. Just as in classical cryptography, an ongoing
search for backdoors is required to build hardened imple-
mentations of quantum cryptography for real-world use.
METHODS
A. Complete Eve’s setup
The task of Eve’s FSG is to make the target detector
at Bob click, while keeping his other detectors silent. An
optical pulse of a peak power Pth at the target detector
4
causes it click with 100% probability. In order for the
FSG depicted in Fig. 1b to work, a pulse of power Pth/2
should never cause the two conjugate-basis detectors to
click. Unfortunately, for the actual Bob’s polarization
analyser (PA) this condition did not hold, because one of
its detectors turned out to have significantly higher click
thresholds than the other three (see Fig. 4). Note that
for blinding power >1µW, the click thresholds of all four
detectors rose uniformly. We tried to change the circular
blinding polarization to elliptical, such that the detector
with higher click threshold received much less blinding
power than the other three. This achieved almost perfect
fidelity of Eve’s control over Bob, with diagonal elements
>96.2% (in terms of Table I) and off-diagonal elements
<0.005%. The latter meant Eve had slightly less than
full information on the sifted key, compromising the se-
curity but requiring an additional cryptanalytic task to
complete the eavesdropping.
We then improved the control method by including a
polarized pre-pulse that dynamically increased blinding
power at the orthogonal-basis detectors 100 ns before the
main trigger pulse was sent (Fig. 5). These pre-pulses
were emitted by four additional laser diodes. With this
setup, clicks never occurred in a wrong detector. When
we calibrated Eve’s control of Bob by sending the same
faked state at a fixed rate, the click probability in any tar-
get detector was 100%, and double clicks did not occur.
However as we discovered later in the recorded experi-
mental data, a cross-talk between adjacent faked states
(which could be as closely spaced as 550 ns during eaves-
dropping) led to slightly less than 100% click probability,
as Table I illustrates. There were also a few double clicks.
Nevertheless Eve managed to recover complete sifted key
by proper post-processing, which shows robustness of this
control method.
B. Jitter and insertion delay introduced by Eve
After initially inserting Eve into the line, her four de-
tection and Bob control channels had slightly different
insertion delays (varying by .1 ns). Since Alice and Bob
used a tight coincidence window to identify photon pairs,
we had to equalize Eve’s insertion delays by adjusting
the time-delay circuits (shown in Fig. 5). As can be
seen in Fig. 6, the resulting relative coincidence time
distributions were indistinguishable from those without
eavesdropping. The jitter between photon pairs stayed
about the same and was dominated by timing jitter of
the single-photon detectors, ≈500 ps full-width at half-
magnitude for each detector.
As Fig. 6 shows, Eve introduced an overall insertion
delay of 212 ns. This went without any consequence, be-
cause Alice and Bob synchronized their clocks by photon
coincidences, which is a common practice in QKD sys-
tems of this type. In general, the propagation delay is
not authenticated and is not a part of the QKD secu-
rity. We remark that if Alice and Bob synchronized their
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squares) was the one tested in Fig. 2.
clocks in some independent way (which is probably im-
practical), Eve could cancel her insertion delay by short-
ening the fibre-optic line and/or bypassing a part of the
line by spatially separating her polarization analyser and
FSG and establishing a line-of-sight radio-frequency link
between them, in which signals travel ∼1.5 times faster
than in fibre23. These tricks would not apply to systems
using a free-space line-of-sight QKD link18–20,29–32, but
so far none of them implemented a clock synchronization
method that would fail because of Eve’s insertion delay.
C. Raw experimental data and Eve’s key
extraction software
There were four eavesdropped QKD sessions over 2 h.
For example, the second session lasted 5min and pro-
duced 393,323-bit sifted key, identical between Bob and
Eve. The raw data recorded during this session and the
script used to extract Eve’s sifted key can be found in
a single archive file: http://www.vad1.com/eve-extract-
sifted-key.zip (74 MiB). The minimum disk space re-
quired is 125 MiB, including files generated by running
the script.
The main script to do Eve’s key extraction, named
eve extract sifted key.m, can be found in the directory
scripts-matlab, while the other files in this directory
are functions called by the main script, and a log file
proclog.txt will be generated after running the script. The
script is written in MATLAB. We have tested it under
both Windows and Linux.
5
TD
TS
FSGFPCLD
PC
PA
clicks ↕
↕
↕
↕
TD
TD
TD
PPG
↕
↕
↕
↕
FPC
↕
↕
~ 5×10
-3
~ 2×10
-4
~ 1×10
-5
Time (ns)
O
p
ti
c
a
l 
p
o
w
e
r 
a
t 
A
P
D
 (
W
)
0 100 110
FPC
FIG. 5. Complete Eve’s setup forming an improved control diagram. This setup was used for all eavesdropping
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The directory data-raw contains the raw experimental
data from this session, recorded during the experiment.
To obey realistic eavesdropping conditions, Eve only gets
access to the classical channel where the transmission is
public (and to her own computer), but not to Bob’s or
Alice’s computers. Hence, the script is run only upon
the timing and basis choice data sent from Bob to Alice
(the subdirectory alice-receivefiles), the sifting response
returned from Alice (the subdirectory bob-receivefiles),
and Eve’s own recorded click data (the subdirectory eve-
raw-events). Although not used by the extraction script,
both sifted and final secret keys recorded in Alice’s and
Bob’s computers are also provided in the archive, to sat-
isfy a curious reader. The final secret key is 218,462 bit
long.
After running the script, Eve’s sifted key will be
extracted and stored in a new directory named data-
produced-by-scripts. The script then does a bitwise com-
parison between Eve’s and Bob’s sifted keys, and reports
the number of discrepancies (which is zero for all eaves-
dropped QKD sessions). For convenience, both Bob’s
and Eve’s sifted keys are also saved as two sets of ASCII
files.
All data is partitioned into files by epoch (defined as a
time span of 229 ns ≈ 0.537 s), except the final secret key
which is stored in blocks of 9 epochs. All file formats are
openly defined and documented21, and have been used in
several QKD experiments previously18–20.
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